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Abstract 
Recent years have been characterised by the increasing encroachment into policy and 
academic debates of discourses describing knowledge and weightless economies and 
an associated ‘war for talent’. In this paper we argue that these current discourses and 
their description of ‘talent’ and the challenge of finding it fail to do full justice to the 
complexities of contemporary elite markets. We argue that the rise of executive search 
firms, headhunters, as labour market intermediaries and their tactics for defining and 
managing contemporary elite labour recruitment practices is too often ignored. We 
show that executive search firms control elite labour recruitment processes through 
two forms of power-relation: one in the labour management process where relations 
between clients and executive search firms are structured by power resources 
constructed over time; and one in the labour market itself where definitions of talent 
are promulgated by search firms, thus determining who does and does not classify as 
a talented individual and who is admitted to the networks that provide access to elite 
executive positions. Building on insights from interviews with headhunters in Europe 
we reveal the strategies producing these positions of power. This leads us to suggest 
that geographers need to pay more attention to the role of discourses in the 
construction of power relations and the role of geography as a resource that is 
empowering but also disempowering. 
 




 Recent years have been characterised by the increasing encroachment into 
policy and academic debates of discourses describing knowledge (Leadbeater, 1999) 
and weightless economies (Quah, 2001). A cornerstone of such discourses is the 
importance of flexible, talented labour as a central factor of production that maintains 
the competitiveness of firms and places in the digital age of contemporary globalization 
(DTI, 1998; Florida, 2002; UNCTAD, 2004). This has been discussed in relation to 
economic activities from Formula I racing (Henry and Pinch, 1999) to financial services 
(The Corporation of London, 2003) to high-technology (Saxenian, 2006). Meanwhile 
and somewhat related to this turn, Thrift (1997) has argued that the behaviour of firms 
is increasingly defined by a ‘cultural circuit of capitalism’. This is a “circuit which is now 
self-organising, is responsible for the production and distribution of managerial 
knowledge to managers. As it has grown, so have its appetites. It now has a constant 
and voracious need for new knowledge. Chief amongst the produces of the managerial 
discourse are three institutions: business schools, management consultants, and 
management gurus” (Thrift, 1997, 34). The ‘knowledge worker’ is one of the central 
components of the discourses Thrift describes.   
The importance of executive talent perhaps became most apparent when a 
group from management consultants McKinsey & Co. produced a report in which they 
declared that there was ‘A war for talent’ (see Michaels et al., 2001). The future 
success of firms was, according to this report, set to be defined by the ability to find, 
recruit and retain the most talented executives who could provide inspirational 
leadership and drive innovation and ultimately profitability in a knowledge-based 
economy. As a result more and more interest has developed in the dynamics of elite 
labour markets. Fortune Magazine (2006) reported in an article entitled, ‘Resurgence 
of the war for talent’ that management consultants have warned businesses that “77% 
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of companies say they don’t have enough successor to their current senior managers 
[and] the talent shortage will probably get worse. The allure of being a corporate 
executive may be fading”. On the surface, then, the message is clear: the main 
challenge for the firm in contemporary elite labour markets is finding talent because 
“the world’s most valuable commodity is getting harder to find” (Economist, 2006, 11). 
 In this paper we argue that the current discourses that describe ‘talent’ and the 
challenge of finding it fail to do full justice to the complexities of contemporary elite 
markets. We argue that the rise of executive search firms, headhunters, as labour 
market intermediaries and their tactics for defining and managing contemporary elite 
labour recruitment practices is too often ignored. This is significant in a process-related 
sense because headhunters have manufactured themselves a position of power in 
elite labour recruitment that allows them to actively regulate labour markets. It is also 
significant because the activities of headhunters are integral to defining the nature of 
‘talent’ in the contemporary economy.  
 In developing this argument we conceptualise contemporary elite labour 
recruitment as a network process and, by drawing on earlier descriptions of the old 
boys network (Michie, 1991) and embedded networks of weak ties (Grannovetter, 
1993), argue that executive search firms act as new and powerful governance agents 
in the networks that influence the present-day movement of talent. Taking inspiration 
from Grabher’s (2006) recent intervention that highlights the importance of recognising 
governance forces in networks, allows us to show that executive search firms control 
elite labour recruitment processes through two forms of power-relation: one in the 
labour management process where relations between clients and executive search 
firms are structured by power resources constructed over time; and one in the labour 
market itself where definitions of talent are promulgated by search firms, thus 
determining who does and does not classify as a talented individual and who is 
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admitted to the networks that provide access to elite executive positions. This creates 
a situation that is reminiscent of the exclusive and powerful elite networks of labour 
recruitment of the past, something missing in discourses that suggest ‘open’ and 
meritocratic elite labour markets in the contemporary knowledge economy where 
finding talent is the main problem. Building on these points and examination of the way 
headhunters develop the resources that create these positions of power allows us to 
develop a theoretical argument about the importance of, first, discursive strategies in 
the engineering of an exclusive role for headhunters in elite labour recruitment 
processes; and, second, the significance of geographically inscribed power relations in 
which geography can act as an empowering and disempowering resource.  
The rest of the paper develops these arguments as follows. After this 
introduction we provide a discussion of the symbiotic, entangled and reproductive 
relationship between elite labour markets and executive search firms, thus teasing out 
the ‘pure’ intermediary influence of headhunters.  We then conceptualise this process 
as producing a ‘new boys network’ that influences elite labour recruitment. The 
empirical section then draws upon interviews conducted with 50 executive search 
researchers and consultants in 21 of the leading executive search firms in Europe and 
the professional bodies representing these firms. Interviews took place between June 
2006 and March 2007 in Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, and Paris and, with 
the exception of one interview, were all recorded and fully transcribed. Interviewees 
ranged from the most senior executives (often the founders of a firm) to mid-ranking 
partners and junior researchers. A member of the project team also attended the 
Association of Executive Search Consultants Annual Researchers Conference in 
London in September 2006 and the same organisation’s Annual European Conference 
in Frankfurt in November 2006. This allowed participation in and observation of 
discussions about the industry. The analysis presented is based on insights from these 
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datasets into the way firms have gone about manufacturing their position as labour 
market intermediaries in the European context and the way candidates are assessed 
and geographically ‘categorised’ by firms as part of the search and selection process. 
This allows us to show that executive search firms use their power and geographical 
knowledge to reproduce their own position of power in elite labour markets and the 
powerful positions of others, something which suggests elite labour markets are 
hierarchically governed and a modern replication of traditional ‘old boys’ (sic) networks. 
The concluding section considers the significance of these findings in relation to 
debates about power as well as elite labour mobility. 
 
Elite labour markets and Executive Search firms   
 The emergence of the idea that talent and ‘knowledge workers’ are the drivers 
of economic success can be attributed to two significant changes in the economy over 
the past fifty years. First, and most structurally, has been the changing role of the so-
called ‘developed’ nations in the global economy (see Dicken, 2007; Massey, 1995). 
The initial rise of low-skilled manufacturing activities in ‘developing’ countries and more 
recently research and development activities in the first-wave newly industrialised 
nations has led to calls for countries with long-histories of manufacturing to ‘move up 
the value chain’ and focus upon knowledge-intensive industries (DTI, 1998). Related to 
this, the rapid emergence of post-industrial economies in the ‘developed’ world, 
characterised by rapid growth in producer and consumer services (Bryson, Daniels 
and Warf, 2003) and high-value technological industries (Saxenian, 2006), has fuelled 
the global demand for executive and highly-specialised, elite labour. This is particularly 
true in places like the global cities (Sassen, 2001), international financial centres 
(Beaverstock, 2006) and technological clusters (Saxenian, 2006).  This emergence of 
new service and technological industries has, at the same time, created the conditions 
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for global elite labour markets as worldwide demand is fuelled by new types of senior 
leadership, scientific and fee-earning occupations which didn’t exist ten or twenty years 
ago (Jones, 1989).  For example, in an industry like accounting, diversification over a 
twenty year period has changed the audit dominated labour market, to one of audit 
and corporate finance, taxation, consulting and, even executive search (Beaverstock, 
2007).  
Second, what might be called the neo-liberalising of labour markets has led to a 
readjustment in the behaviours of employers and employees alike (Herod, 2000; Peck, 
1996).  This process, which has bitten most in the past two decades, has multiple 
facets that we cannot fully explore here. Most significant for our argument, however, is 
the effect on labour mobility. An important tenet of neo-liberal policies is free labour 
markets and unrestrictive labour regulations in which responsibility for success lies 
with the individual rather than the state or their employer. As Finlay and Coverdill 
(2000) argue, since the late 1970s in the USA and more recently the UK and other 
parts of Europe and the world, one effect of this has been the weakening of ties 
between employers and employees1. This is a result of both the growing ability and 
willingness of employers to dismiss workers and at the same time an increasing 
willingness of employees to change jobs frequently so as to progress their career. This 
has often replaced the ‘job for life’ culture, although variants of this do still exist in a 
number of countries. Consequently the idea of the ‘internal labour market’, where firms 
promote to the leadership ranks from within, has withered with, instead, the worldwide 
                                                 
1
 Of course, it is important to note that this change has been geographically variegated and has taken 
place at different paces in different countries (Peck, 1996). Indeed it could be argued that Germany and 
Japan provide two examples of countries where change has been limited (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
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search for talent becoming a major preoccupation of managers in transnational 
corporations. 
 
Fluid labour markets? 
 The initial analysis of the contemporary conditions of elite labour markets would 
suggest a geographical fluidity unhindered by regulation and favouring those with 
‘talent’ however defined. This, we contend, is far from the case. A critique of ‘free’ 
labour markets could be made based on a discussion of the regulatory hurdles to the 
free movement of labour (see for example Neumayer [2006]). However, most pertinent 
in relation to our interest in executive search firms is the falsity of the neo-liberal 
market ideal of buyers and sellers (employers and employees) negotiating in a free 
and open markets. A number of important labour intermediaries have emerged, with 
temping agencies at the ‘bottom’ unskilled end of the market (Peck and Theodore, 
2001; Peck et al. 2005; Ward, 2004) and executive search at the ‘top’, elite skilled end 
of the market (Faulconbridge et al., 2008; Finlay and Coverdill, 2000; Jenn, 2005). It is 
work on temping that has provided the seminal contribution to our understanding of 
this phenomenon and its implications for labour market dynamics.        
      As Peck and Theodore (2001, 476) discuss, temp agencies as intermediaries in 
labour markets are “both an orchestrator and a beneficiary of the explosion in 
contingent employment”. In the context of our discussions here this means “temp 
agencies are more than passive beneficiaries of these trends in industrial 
(re)organization. They actively shape the growth in contingent labor through their role 
controlling virtues of workforce flexibility” (Peck and Theodore, 2001, 477). Such 
intermediaries have, then, engineered themselves a space in neo-liberal labour 
markets and now fulfil a role that, whilst unanticipated in a perfect market scenario, is 
incredibly powerful. As Theodore and Peck (2002) note, the strategy of these agencies 
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is innately geographical, reconstituting itself so that firms can become embedded in 
different cities and states are operate effectively. Indeed, Ward (2004) documents how 
temp agencies have also successfully proliferated and adapted both the logic of 
contingent labour but also their intermediary role as part of an internationalisation 
process that has produced ever-growing demand in countries outside of the US and 
UK heartlands of leading firms.  
 We make a similar argument here in relation to executive search firms but in 
doing so refer to the opposite end of the market – elite, permanent labour (which we 
define further below) – and focus specifically on: (a) the new power relations 
associated with the emergence and legitimation of search firms; and (b) the effects of 
headhunters new governance role on definitions of and the mobility of ‘talented’ elite 
labour. 
 
Elite labour markets, executive search firms and power-laden networks 
 Here we take elite labour to be defined as workers fulfilling positions at the 
pinnacles of organizational hierarchies (e.g. chief executives, chief financial officers) or 
specialist skilled roles (e.g. in the oil and gas industry; Chinese equity analysts; 
research and development scientists in particular niches of the bio-tech sector etc). 
Executive search firms distinguish themselves from temping agencies and other 
search agencies through their focus upon the locating and recruiting of such elite 
labour (table 1 notes the major global players in the industry). Rather than acting on a 
contingent basis like many temp agencies and middle-management recruiters do 
(payment of completion of task) retained executive search firms set their fees in 
advance, usually demanding payment of fifty percent up front and fifty percent at the 
end of the project (Jones, 1989). This typically means a fee of equivalent to one third 
of the first year salary of the recruited executive. These firms never work on projects 
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where the minimum first year salary of a candidate is below £100,000 (Jenn, 2005). 
Hence salary ultimately defines elite labour in the eyes of these firms.  
By 2004, Jenn (2005) estimates that the executive search industry’s revenues 
were worth US$2,500m. Many of the firms are partnerships and as such do not publish 
details of annual turnovers. However selective self reporting of turnover by firms and 
proxy measures such as office numbers can be used to reveal impressive growth in 
the industry throughout the 1990s. For example, between 1980 and 2006 the number 
of European offices of the fifty largest international firms grew from 50 to 871 
(Beaverstock et al., 2006). Most of this growth took place, however, between 1990 and 
2000 since when a recovery and reorientation period has been necessary to offset the 
damage caused by the dot.com bust. For example, one of the leading firms, Korn 
Ferry, saw revenue grow from US$315m in 2000 to only US$328m in 2005 (Executive 
Grapevine, 2000; 2005). 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
The ‘headhunting’ practice of these firms itself has been described in detail 
elsewhere (Finlay and Coverdill, 2000; Jenn, 2005). Here, then, we focus solely on the 
elements most pertinent to our argument. As a result of the desire to transform the 
executive search industry into a scientific activity, a number of business processes 
have emerged which are designed to make the whole search and selection activity 
transparent and methodological rigorous in line with new risk cultures (Beck, 1992). 
The chronology of the search process can thus be characterised as follows:  
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• Mapping the market – using a researcher and consultant’s knowledge and 
contacts to list competing firms where suitable candidates could be found and 
seek out background information and contacts for these individuals. 
• Using the firm’s database to search for suitable candidates. 
• Sourcing – using known contacts and individuals in the firm’s database to elicit 
recommendations for possible candidates. 
 
These strategies of the modern-day headhunter produce the networks that define elite 
labour recruitment. In order to be successful in elite labour markets candidates need to 
be known to search consultants and/or part of their database and/or connected to 
individuals connected to headhunters. Of course, it is not particularly new to suggest 
elite labour mobility involves negotiating a power-laden network. The origins of the 
suggestion can be traced back to the idea of the ‘old boy network’ in the City of 
London and the way school and club ties and family nepotism determined the career 
path of an individual (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Michie, 1999). Indeed, one of the main 
discourses associated with the war for talent has been the need to destroy such 
networks because of their inefficiencies and inability to recruit the ‘best’ talent (Jones, 
1989). Granovetter (1983) similarly described how the ‘strength of weak ties’ and the 
network social capital of an individual was instrumental in finding a job in the 1970s. 
Again, recent developments such as the Internet have challenged the foundations of 
this argument, with forms of search and network formation that were impossible in the 
past now enabled by new technologies. Yet our research suggests that hierarchical, 
restrictive network practices have actually been reproduced in contemporary elite 




Conceptualising executive search firms as governance agents  
According to our research, both potential candidates and headhunters continue 
to understand elite labour markets, at least in part, as sophisticated networks. This is 
mainly because recruitment still occurs through the consultant’s network, something 
now more extensive thanks to the internet and the databases of search firms, but 
something that is still ‘exclusive’ and in need of penetration by candidates in new and 
important ways. Of course, as Dicken et al. (2001) suggest, it is essential to recognise 
all networks as socio-spatial constructions, not simply as connections or pipelines. This 
means analysing the various actors, technologies and social, cultural and political 
influences upon entrance into and action within a network. In terms of our discussion 
here, the elite labour recruitment mediated by executive search firms might be 
conceptualised as such a network because, firstly, the knowledge, databases and 
sourcing described above produce an infrastructure that creates connections between 
clients (employers) and candidates (potential employees). For candidates entrance 
into these networks is essential. As Ibarra and Hunter (2007) argue, successful 
executives are defined by their ability to develop and maintain such ‘personal’ 
networks which can then be used to enhance their career and open doors through the 
development of new contacts and relationships. This reflects in many ways the 
strength of weak ties that Granovetter described (1983). However, in the case of 
contemporary elite labour networks entrance into the network also requires the 
performance of certain idealised behaviours which are socially and culturally 
constructed and associated with the ‘ideal’ candidate. This, then, is our second reason 
for using the network metaphor.  
The ‘model’ candidate is defined and controlled by researchers and consultants 
in firms who act as gatekeepers to the network. In effect we argue that to understand 
contemporary elite labour recruitment requires us to understand the factors influencing 
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whether a candidate can successfully makes contact with a potential employer, 
something ultimately determined by whether an individual is able to acquire the 
appropriate social and cultural capital that allows them become part of and function 
within the headhunter’s network. This, we suggest, lies at the heart of the emergence 
of the ‘new’ boy’s network that is used to recruit executives in the contemporary 
knowledge economy. We understand executive search firms’ roles within ‘new’ elite 
labour networks to be, then, “a specific mode of governance” (Grabher 2006:167). 
Grabher claims that networks are too often viewed as somewhat benign, democratic, 
innovative formations and that there is often a failure to theorise the full complexities of 
network processes. In particular, according the Grabher, recognition of the way 
networks can be exclusive and restrictive is needed. “Notions like the tertius gaudens 
(the third who benefits) and ‘structural equivalence’ [that] exemplify the critical role of 
network position and structure and fundamentally depart from the cohesion-fixated 
ideas of networks” (Grabher, 2006, 165).  
The cases of elite labour market networks and the governing role of 
headhunters help to develop this argument by fleshing out the way governance roles 
are defined and the power relations these roles produce. As Allen (2003) argues, 
power is a relational construct and emerges because of the practices and resources 
used to produce certain forms of relationship between individuals and groups. 
Depending on how resources such as money, ideas and technology are used, and 
importantly how others respond to these resources, different types of power relation 
emerge. This ranges from domination (imposed power) to manipulation (power created 
through the concealment of intent when developing relationships). Below we show how 
executive search firms have effectively developed relations of authority (claimed and 
conceded power based on a willingness by others to recognise and accept control by 
an agent) that allow them to act as intermediary governance agents in elite labour 
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networks. This has, in some senses, parallels to Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
(1991). In effect we unpack Executive search firms’ ‘art of governmentality’ as they 
strive to institutionalise their role in elite labour markets. We then also show the way 
that the activities of headhunters provides resources to certain candidates in elite 
labour market, rendering them dominant (power gained because of an imposed form of 
conduct/identity) as a result of their geographical biographies and experience. 
Together these two forms of power define the contemplator geographies of elite labour 
markets.  
     
Authority to search: manufacturing the role of executive search firms in elite 
labour markets 
 Changing conceptions of labour market behaviour on the part of employers and 
employees have acted as one of the most significant spurs for the development of the 
executive search industry. This has produced a new generation of workers that accept 
the need to move between employers to develop their career. Similarly corporations 
are now familiar with the ‘war for talent’ this has created. As one executive search 
consultant noted: 
“It is a generational thing, in this day and age information flows across markets so 
readily and there is a fundamental supply and demand problem of management 
talent all over the world…the opportunity for advancement often comes in from the 
places where you are not, those who are sophisticated about their careers they 
understand how to function in this world (Consultant, Frankfurt). 
For executive search firms this change acts as the context for the development of a 
position of authority in elite labour recruitment networks. Like temping agencies, 
headhunters need to be active institutional agents in the creation of their own markets 
so as to ensure demand for their services which, in a perfect market where rational 
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logic prevails, would not be required. In order to do this, firms have adopted a number 
of interrelated strategies. 
 
Promoting discourses of complexity 
Perhaps one of the most important strategies of executive search firms has 
been the use and proliferation of the types of discourses outlined at the start of the 
paper. Promoting the idea that talent is scarce yet essential in order to maximise 
profitability has allowed headhunters to effectively ‘scare’ firms into seeking support in 
the recruitment of executives. As Kelly (2001, 722) points out, discourses can be more 
than linguistic devices. They can also be “material because [they] bring into being 
classifications of objects, bodies, identities, and so on, and exist as situated practices”. 
The discourses proliferated have acted as powerful devices for the production of the 
economic practice of using search firms to recruit executive labour. Two ideas in 
particular are used to manufacture a position of power for headhunters in this process.  
First, executive search firms invoke ideas of risk as a tool for creating demand 
for their services. As Beck (1992) and others (e.g. Drori and Meyer, 2006) have shown, 
risk management is now central to life both within and without of the corporate world. 
The so-called risks associated with finding elite labour in the ‘war for talent’ are 
coupled to the growing political interest in corporate governance issues following the 
scandals that rocked corporate America in the early 2000s and the subsequent 
implementation in the USA of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 legitimating 
headhunters’ roles. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act highlighted and regulated for 
the first time issues associated with conflicts of interest and the use of ‘favours’ in the 
appointment of particularly senior staff, something that resulted in new demands from 
capital markets in relation to the recruitment of executives. Investors and large pension 
funds expect firms to prove that they have minimised the risks associated with 
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appointing a new chief executive or chief financial officer. Consequently, the ‘old boys 
network’ has now been comprehensively dismissed as a flawed strategy for 
recruitment and executive search firms have put themselves forward as the new best-
practice for elite labour recruitment. As one interviewee responded when asked why 
clients appoint headhunters: 
“To minimise risk. If you appoint someone who is know to the chairman, if you pop an 
advert in the Sunday Times and you take the best out of the 200 people that apply you 
are not necessarily getting the best person to do the job. If you work with an executive 
search firm you can really do a proper audit, you can really make certain that you have 
the absolute best person to do that job and, therefore, the risk for the corporation is 
much much less” (Consultant, London). 
There is, of course, little evidence that appointing a headhunter actually reduces the 
risk of the recruitment process. However, the use of the type of rhetoric described 
above has effectively institutionalised executive search firms as risk-management 
agents. Indeed, so successful has this been that, as a different interviewee noted: 
“The Higgs Report says that if you don’t use a headhunter to recruit in public  
companies for a non executive directives you should explain why you didn’t in your 
annual report, so that has created a new stream of business” (Consultant, London)
 2
.     
Second, and building on the ideas discussed in the opening section of the paper, 
executive search firms are keen to promote the enormity of the challenge of finding 
and then recruiting skilled executives. The combination of both the globalisation of the 
search for elite labour and paradoxically the information over-load created by the 
Internet that now allows anyone to find hundreds of potential candidates through 
relatively simply searches has, according to headhunters, makes the task of finding 
                                                 
2
 The Higgs report, commissions by the UK government, examined the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors and the most appropriate way to recruit individuals who would champion shareholders interests. 
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elite labour impossible for unskilled individuals. This means both existing executives 
but also human resources departments cannot manage the task effectively. As one 
interviewee claimed: 
“a very thorough search procedure is quite painstaking, it does take a lot of time and I 
don’t think management today is in such a position to invest that much time. In my days 
you used to put an add in the paper, get 150 replies, you then interviewed – imagine 
now how much management capacity you are freezing with that, when you look at the 
actual hours and what you are doing to your organization it is crazy. So it is pure time, 
so you say let an expert deal with it…we provide a broader background, we have the 
distance, we can look at multiple aspects – and we have a network they don’t have 
because this is all we do, that’s our job, that’s our living” (Consultant, London). 
Because of the immensity of the challenge posed by this new ‘market’ for elite labour, 
headhunters are also keen to highlight the need for skill, expertise and most 
significantly experience in order to effectively seek out and obtain the services of the 
most appropriate executives. As one consultant put it: 
“if you are recruiting a finance director for example, a finance director probably lasts 
five or six years in the job, the chances are that the HR department has never recruited 
a finance director, I’ve got somebody here who recruits 25 finance directors a year, 
finding the right finance director is business critical, why on earth give than job to 
someone who has never done it. Look what is the most important thing for nearly every 
organisation, its having the right people in the top jobs, if you haven’t got that you’re 
stuffed aren’t you and if you have then you will be alright, it is the thing that matters. 
You ask your lawyer to advise you on law, you ask your accountant to advise you on 
finance it would be extraordinary not to let somebody advise you on recruiting, what an 
extraordinary thing to do in house. What is so odd is that people still do do it, they’re 
bonkers” (Consultant, London). 
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By drawing on these strategies that are founded on the discourses of talent and the 
knowledge economy described in the opening of the paper, search firms are effectively 
closing-off the market for elite labour recruitment. Headhunters claim to be the only 
people with the high-levels of expertise needed to find talent, something that produces 
a new and powerful logic that informs recruitment practices. As potential clients seem 
to have accepted this logic and have become enrolled into the idea that headhunters 
are the only way to recruit executives, search firms have developed powerful positions 
in executive labour markets. Using this as a starting point, firms then use the various 
‘technologies’ at their disposal as resources to further consolidate this position. 
 
Technologies of simplification 
The database.  The use of the firm’s own database is seen as a key starting 
point in identifying potential candidates. For headhunters the database is much more 
than just a data-mining tool. Rather it is used to identify the existing ‘stars’ and known-
contacts holding the position the client wants to fill. This allows researchers and 
consultants to both identify the prime candidates for the vacancy but also set the 
parameters for the search in terms of the ‘type’ of candidate that might fit the position 
being filled. As one interviewee noted: 
“Frequently we can use [the database] to spark ideas, we don’t think of the 
database as a source of candidates as much as a source of authorities in a given 
area, to give us a view on who the stars are in a given sector and that can help us 
when we make an approach to an individual” (Consultant, London). 
These databases are also linked to what is known in the sector as ‘sourcing’. 
Sourcing is a process of identifying individuals holding the same position as the 
vacancy to be filled but in another firm and then, assuming they are not 
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interested in the job, infiltrating their networks as a source of recommendations 
for potential candidates.  So as one consultant put it: 
“The database is not for identifying candidates…Sourcing is the real link with the 
specialisation because you start to think who are the actors on the market, then 
you not only start to find candidates but you also try to get information from a 
certain number of people, they may not be interested but they may know 
someone” (Consultant, Paris), 
In promotional rhetorics the ‘power’ of these databases is always also couched 
alongside the firms’ second main resource.  
The researcher and consultant. Perhaps one of the main evolutions in recent 
times in the discourses of executive search firms has been the emergence of a client-
service ethos. This has centred upon the value-added delivered by consultants and 
their teams of researchers beyond providing a list of potential candidates. Importantly, 
one strategy has been to play up the ways in which the contemporary service offered 
by headhunters is very different to that offered in the past. As one interviewee put it, “I 
think we have changed, we have become more professional, we are more organised 
we are more professional than we used to be, but also certain segments of society are 
becoming more sophisticated, more receptive to working with consultants, could be 
NGOs could be universities could be schools” (Consultant, Brussels).  
 This ‘relational’ tactic of marking-out the contemporary headhunter as different 
to the ‘old boy’, rolodex generation was an important ploy used by all of those 
interviewed. Moreover, heavy reference was often made to the ‘knowledge rich’ and 
‘bespoke’ nature of services offered to clients. As part of this self-promotion 
consultants and researchers were keen to point out that, beyond identifying technically 
qualified candidates, they are skilled at convincing an individual to consider and then 
accept a position, even when they may not be looking to move firms. The scarcity of 
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talent is made worse, or so headhunters would have you believe, because the best 
candidates are often unwilling to move organisation let alone countries, as is often 
necessary. Consultants claim to have the experience and tacit skill that can convince a 
seemingly uninterested candidate to look at a vacancy. As one researcher described 
this salesman-like skill in relation to the challenges of dealing with an individual’s 
nervousness at superiors finding out he/she was considering another job: 
“Sometimes if you ring someone and they haven’t been headhunted they think that 
their boss as given you their name and they are really paranoid that somebody has 
given them their name because they are going to be ousted of the company so you 
have to reassure them that nobody has told you that you are looking, it is just an 
opportunity, you don’t have to listen or even read the information but it is an opportunity 
so why not have a look at it, so you can persuade people but generally the more senior 
the individual the more they get it” (Researcher, London). 
Together, the ‘technologies’ of the database and the skills and expertise of researchers 
and consultants act as resources that are used in discourses to reinforce the authority 
of executive search firms as the only way to find and recruit elite talent. This has been 
critical to the proliferation of the market for executive search outside of the USA in the 
past twenty years and means that these firms now have a powerful position in elite 
labour markets in many countries4. In terms of our conceptualisation of elite labour 
                                                 
4
 This does, of course, point to the interesting question about the geographical variability in the success 
of search firms in developing this authority. Interviews revealed that this varied between the case-study 
countries and the this authority often did not exist outside of Western Europe and North America. This, 
however, is a discussion for another paper and is not central to our argument here about elite labour 
networks.  
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markets as networks it means the search firms have been able to engineere 
themselves a governance role in existing networks, disintermediating candidates and 
employers and requiring both parties to follow the rules of the game set-down by 
headhunters. These rules, whilst promoted as being beneficial for all involved, might 
not, however, always have benign effects on the geographies of elite labour 
recruitment. In particular, as we argue below, the powerful position of executive search 
firms seems to be leading to the emergence of what we term a ‘new’ boys network in 
which talent is assessed and defined in part at least by geographical biographies. This 
leads to the domination of a certain type of geographical-marked ‘ideal type’ executive, 
an unintentional consequence perhaps of the war for talent and executive search firms’ 
governance role in elite labour markets.   
 
Domination through geography: the ideal-type executive 
In order for executive search firms to deal with the complexities of finding ‘talent’ 
researchers and consultants develop heuristic models of ‘ideal’ candidates for top 
executive jobs. Here we do not attempt to differentiate between the skills or 
characteristics needed by executives in different positions (e.g. a chief executive of a 
large manufacturing corporation versus a head of human resources for an international 
bank). Instead, we focus upon some of the common characteristics that cut-across 
sectoral specificities.  
In particular, because clients are often transnational corporations themselves, 
there is often a desire to recruit a ‘global elite’, someone who would fit in what Sklair 
(2001) describes as a transnational capitalist class. Indeed, even clients operating in 
only one country often want a ‘worldly’ executive that can bring with them experience 
from multiple countries. Consequently, as one interviewee put it: 
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“When you speak about recruitment at a certain level you don’t look local. Most of 
our assignments now are pan-European, we don’t look for a candidate only in 
France, there is no difference from a German, an Italian, British with experience 
working in France, they will have an international background. Our biggest 
customer is looking form members of their steering committee to come from 
abroad, not being French. To be on this international level you need to have a 
multicultural team, because plenty of their subsidiaries are abroad” (Consultant, 
Paris).  
This does not, however, mean that any individual with experience of working in 
multiple countries will automatically catch the attention of the headhunter. Criteria, 
which we outline in detail below, are used by both researchers and consultants to 
determine whether an individual ever enters the headhunter’s database. This is 
significant as it suggests that the labour recruitment networks headhunters govern can 
only be entered when certain social, cultural and geographical knowledges and 
practices are gained and performed. In effect, for many executives the chance of 
getting a phone call from a headhunter is determined both by technical ability to do the 
job but also by key geographical markers on their curriculum vitae.  
 
The geographically inscribed candidate 
We have already described the importance of international mobility in marking out a 
leading executive. However this needs to be a carefully targeted mobility. As one 
consultant put it “if your business is an international one then you want people with 
exposure of that whether they are from within the UK or elsewhere, so you need that, 
you want them to bring that set of experiences, but frequently there are quite specific 
geographies” (Consultant, London). In particular, work experience in the UK and/or 
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USA and other ‘hot-spots’ of the global economy is an essential criterion in most 
situations. As one researcher described: 
“Frankly it is much more often the case that somebody from outside comes to 
Germany, so we hire somebody from the US or the UK or France, it depends upon 
the career history of somebody, so you would never hire a pure Germany who has 
studied in Germany, worked in Germany and never lived abroad, the candidates 
we are interested in they are international, they are German yes but they did an 
MBA in the US, they lived for 3 years in Asia so you wouldn’t regard them as being 
German” (Researcher, Frankfurt).  
We return to the point made about education below. First though it is important to 
further unpick the geographical markers of an attractive mobile executive. 
Unsurprisingly, language is also another issue and as one interviewee described, “We 
are working on a search at the moment looking for head of one of the big design 
houses, and we found out one the candidates couldn’t speak English so that was the 
end of her, if you can’t speak English you can’t be headhunted” (Researcher, London). 
Speaking English means being fluent in the language, something that almost inevitably 
means having worked in an English speaking country for a period of time. This again 
inscribes a geography onto the ideal candidate. Moreover, depending on the client, the 
ideal candidate will usually have also worked in one or several of the ‘hotspots’ of an 
industry. For finance this means London or New York. For information technology 
Silicon Valley. For oil one of the Gulf States or West Africa. Without experience in one 
of these places an individual is seen as lacking the necessary knowledge but also 
intuition gained from experience of these key marketplaces.  
In addition and as already highlighted above, the reification of the ideal candidate 
has led to a distinct homogeneity in terms of educational expectations. This is true both 
in terms of undergraduate and postgraduate education with two markers of the ideal-
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type candidate. First, a degree from a prestigious university. This means an institution 
listed in the top echelons of one of the many league tables such as Newsweek’s World 
University Rankings. Second, for a position in business, an individual must usually 
have an MBA, again from a leading university and preferably a university in the USA or 
UK. As one interviewee described these two dynamics:   
“Having an MBA because more and more people have degrees and second 
degrees so there has to be things that differentiate and if you are being very elitist 
about this then going to Oxbridge” (Researcher, London). 
Perhaps one complication here is nationally-specific snobbery associated with 
educational qualifications. So, for example, one consultant suggested that the French 
had a slightly different attitude with French qualifications being privileged. As he put it: 
“if you are speaking about classical European markets like France, you need not 
only be based in Paris, you need a French network that is typical to the French, a 
social organisation, so you have to have graduated from a nice business school, 
you need to have been in some civil servant position before” (Consultant, Paris).  
Here we see a less international perspective but still the continuation of geographically 
inscribed characteristics in the sense of having studied in the ‘right’ place. When 
combined with the mobility dynamics described above, a clear geography begins to 
emerge of the ideal candidate. This is an individual with international experience in the 
leading commercial or industry centres of the world. They will have spent time in the 
UK or USA and will have been educated at one of a handful of elite institutions 
throughout the world.  
In addition, individuals will also know how to ‘be in the right place’. The ‘right 
place’ refers to the right social networks and social spaces in which headhunters seek 
out potential candidates. The strength of weak ties continues. This means having 
membership of relevant professional associations and attending their social events and 
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a wider social circuit of charity evenings and launch parties. As one consultant 
commented about his tactics for spotting candidates, “I have membership of 6 or 7 
medical societies, and I go to conferences, I do that several times a year and meet 
people there, this gives me an opportunity to meet people in these sectors” 
(Consultant, Brussels).  
Of course, membership of such associations is not open to everyone, 
being exclusive an even invite-based on occasions. Therefore, whilst the process 
of getting headhunted seems innocuous enough on the surface, for those with 
the ‘wrong’ geography and outside of the ‘club’ world of headhunters 
opportunities for entering the networks that secure executive positions are 
limited, something that can be detrimental for an individuals career success. 
Indeed, as one interviewee confirmed, “At the end of the day a headhunter is 
only as good as their network, their personal relationship database…The 
ultimate headhunter is the person who doesn’t have to do any cold calling” 
(Consultant, London). Many fail to enter this network when they don’t have the 
right geographical markers because, as one interviewee noted: 
“in our case you only make it into the database if you are screened by us to 
some extent…or we know enough about you and we think it is worthwhile for you 
to be in our database” (Consultant, London). 
Most interviewees suggested it wasn’t worth putting individuals in the database if they 
didn’t fit, in part at least, the ‘ideal’ model outlined above. The geographical 
exclusiveness in elite labour markets that results from such a selective filtering 
procedure in the headhunting process is also then further reinforced by the sourcing 
strategies of consultants because of how ideal-type candidates often only 
recommending people they know will fit the headhunters’ model. All of this produces 
what might be called the ‘new boys network’ of executive search. Indeed, as one 
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interviewee suggested, “The old boys network still remains [but] these techniques [of 
using the database and sourcing] make it possible to cover your ass” (Consultant, 
Amsterdam). Of course, we are not suggesting that every candidate will fit the 
headhunters ‘model’ perfectly, or that those without the ‘ideal’ geographical markers 
will never be headhunted. Rather it means that there is an elite and preferred stratum 
of candidates who dominate in elite labour markets at the expense of those not fitting 
the model. Consequently, individuals with the right geographical biographies gain 
powerful, dominant positions in elite labour markets leaving those less-than ideal-type 
candidates poorly placed to compete in what, according to the rhetoric, are open, 
talent-defined and fluid elite labour markets in the contemporary knowledge economy.   
 
Conclusions 
 In this paper we have sought to critically analyse many of the discourses that 
surround the knowledge economy and ideals of elite labour mobility through an 
examination of the role of executive search firms. In doing this we have made two main 
arguments. First, we have shown how search firms have constructed themselves a 
position of power in elite labour markets, in part by utilising many of the discourses 
associated with the knowledge economy. Second, we have suggested that this 
process has resulted in the emergence of a new form of geographically-inscribed 
hierarchy and exclusiveness in elite labour markets, what we have termed the ‘new 
boys network’. This has implications for a number of existing debates.  
 Theoretically, our arguments develop existing discussions of networks and 
organisational geographies of power. The analysis of the way executive search firms 
have used various discourses and technologies to construct their position of power in 
elite labour recruitment processes suggests much more emphasis should be placed on 
the way organisations organise in order to manufacture such economically beneficial 
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situations. Taking organizing to be a verb, we have shown the way search firms have 
strategically enrolled existing cultural circuits of capitalism (Thrift 1997) and coupled 
them to the technologies of firms as resources for developing relationships of power 
with potential clients. This reveals the way that positions of power emerge as a result 
of the tactical, discourse fuelled behaviours of individuals within firms and that such 
positions are likely to be temporally fluid as the resources enrolled change in their 
value and usefulness. This mirrors Foucault’s (1991) idea of governmentality but 
applies the concept in an organizational setting to understand the ‘art of 
governmentality’ and the resources associated with the construction of power relations.  
Indeed, the governance role in elite labour recruitment networks afforded 
executive search firms mean that, as intermediaries acting as gatekeepers, individuals 
must negotiate access to potential employers through headhunters. This means fitting 
the candidate models constructed, models that empower individuals with certain types 
of geographical knowledge, experience and mobility. This benefits those with Anglo-
American origins and/or experiences, disempowers those from outside of the capitalist 
hotspots of the contemporary economy and creates a geographical bent to elite labour 
markets. In effect executive search firms, through their governance actions, render 
powerful the resources of certain individuals and render less powerful the knowledge 
and experiences of others. This highlights to the importance of also recognising the 
geographically imbued nature of power relations, with geographical histories 
determining the relative value of an individual’s resources. Moreover it also suggests 
that it is important to further tease apart both the way intentional strategies allow 
resources to be exploited for the creation of powerful relations, but also the way 
individuals and groups can be unintentionally disempowered by the actions of others. 
Whilst power relations might not be a zero-sum game (Allen, 2003), it seems that the 
relational nature of power constantly produces new geographical power geometries 
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defining the influence of different groups. The losers, perhaps predictably, are those 
operating outside of hegemonic places and systems in the contemporary economy. 
This challenges the idea of the knowledge economy being meritocratic and 
open to all with talent.  
One significant caveat should, however, be added to this argument. As Allen 
(2003) points out, the development of power relations involves an agent manufacturing 
a position of power through the deployment of resources but also the enrolment and 
‘acceptance’ of this by other parties. In the case of the authority of executive search 
firms the acceptance by clients of the belief that a candidate with a particular 
geographical biography is likely to be the best person for an executive position has 
been somewhat taken for granted. We have not, then, explored the geographically 
variegated ways that clients respond to the deployment of these resources by 
executive search firms. It would seem important to further examine the variations in 
acceptance, role and practice of search firms between markets. For example, it might 
be expected that in the UK and USA client behaviours are very similar (as the Anglo-
American model in the varieties of capitalism literatures would suggest) whilst German 
markets and Japanese clients would be very different due to diverse labour institutions 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Space has prohibited a full analysis of this here. However, it 
would seem a fruitful avenue for further investigation. Indeed, as we have shown, 
geography seems to be an inherent part of the discourses and power relations 
associated with the knowledge economy, something that generally deserves much 
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MRI Worldwide 680 54 65 4500 
Korn/Ferry 
International  
402 23 73 426 
Heidrick & Struggles 
International 
375 22 58 297 
Spencer Stuart 362 19 49 292 
Egon Zehnder 
International 
336 28 59 290 
Russell Reynolds 
Associates 
268 12 33 133 
Ray & Berndtson 147 28 50 300 
Amrop-Hever 135 40 78 264 
Globe 130 20 15 N/A 




Table 1. The top ten transnational executive search firms ranked by worldwide revenue 
(US$). 
Source: Executive Grapevine (2005). 
 
 
